

PROJECT PRESENTATION “RUSSIA FUTURES PROJECT” / “MEETING CHINA HALFWAY”

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




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
Projects

1. US-China Relations
2. US-Russia Relations
3. China-Russia Relations



“Cooperation Spirals”

- Gradualism
- Reciprocity
- Fairness
- Enforceability




“US-North Korean contradictions have been transformed into US-China contradictions. China has become the ‘wall blocking the wind.’”

“DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS CURRENTLY IN THE KEY PERIOD”

“If denuclearization fails on the Korean Peninsula, China will be harmed the most.”

“... [now] ‘stability’ has been put in ahead of ‘denuclearization’” and a new concept ‘no fighting, no chaos, no collapse’ has been described as the main principle in China’s Korean policy.”



“This was the first time that the US government had openly declared that the ‘nine dashed line’ is inconsistent with international law, thus rejecting China’s historic claim, and also indicating a major revision in America’s policy in the South China Sea.”

“... the US has ... added two new policies against China’s long-standing position ... [T]he US opposes sovereignty claims based on historical rights, and opposes negotiating the disputes in bilateral ways.”

“... the US has openly opposed Chinese efforts to create platforms for bilateral negotiated resolution of South China Sea maritime disputes, thus placing continuous pressure on China, and demanding that China initiate multilateral negotiations with ASEAN.”

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Feb 2015
Naval & Merchant Ships

越南海军装备现代化进程正在加速进行。在2014年，越南海军接收了首批国产的“元戎”级轻型护卫舰。这些舰艇的服役将显著提升越南海军的远洋作战能力。此外，越南还计划在未来几年内建造更多的现代化舰艇，以应对日益复杂的南海局势。

除了舰艇的更新换代，越南还加强了与周边国家的海上合作。通过参与东盟防务部长级会议和香格里拉对话会，越南积极展示其维护南海和平稳定的决心。同时，越南也在加强与美国、日本等国家的军事交流，提升自身的海上自卫能力。

展望未来，越南海军将继续加大投入，推动装备现代化进程。随着新型潜艇和护卫舰的陆续服役，越南海军的综合实力将得到进一步增强。在维护国家海洋权益和地区和平稳定的道路上，越南将坚定不移地走下去。

随着新型潜艇的服役，越南海军将具备更强的隐蔽性和威慑力。这些潜艇的部署将使得越南在南海的军事存在更加难以察觉，从而有效遏制潜在的威胁。此外，新型潜艇的服役也将提升越南海军的远程打击能力，使其能够更好地应对各种海上安全挑战。

在构建大型056A型轻型护卫舰方面，越南展现出了强大的工业实力和建造能力。这些舰艇的服役将使得越南海军在南海的巡逻和执法能力得到显著提升。同时，056A型护卫舰的服役也将增强越南海军的防空和反导能力，使其能够更好地应对日益复杂的南海安全形势。

综上所述，越南海军正在经历一场深刻的变革。通过引进先进装备和加强海上合作，越南海军的综合实力得到了全面提升。在未来的南海局势中，越南海军将能够更好地维护国家利益和地区和平稳定。

"[With the new submarines, the Vietnamese Navy] ... will be more stealthy, independent, and capable of deterrence .."




"... with the advantage of constructing large numbers [of Type 056A light frigates], this should be sufficient to cope with Vietnam's conventional submarines."


新型基洛级潜艇
何时服役?

据预测，越南的新型基洛级潜艇将在未来几个月内服役。这些潜艇的服役将使得越南海军的潜艇力量得到显著增强。同时，新型基洛级潜艇的服役也将提升越南海军的远程作战能力，使其能够更好地应对南海的复杂局势。

除了新型基洛级潜艇的服役，越南还计划在未来几年内建造更多的现代化舰艇。这些舰艇的服役将使得越南海军的综合实力得到进一步提升。同时，越南也将加强与周边国家的海上合作，提升自身的海上自卫能力。




Cooperation Spiral: Southeast Asia 合作螺旋：东南亚





Projects

1. US-China Relations
2. US-Russia Relations
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Russia Futures Project—Summary Report

On 25 March 2016, the Naval War College convened a group of faculty experts to discuss Russia's future trajectory and the challenge it may pose to U.S. national security. The group of about 20 professors included many with extensive Russian-language skills and significant time in either Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, or Central Europe. There were also a number of faculty members with diplomatic and military experience dealing with Moscow present for the seminar. Some faculty experts with specialized knowledge (e.g., Syria, energy, arms control) were also invited to participate. As a forum open to the whole of the NWC faculty, the group not only was exceptionally knowledgeable regarding Russian affairs and associated issues but can genuinely provide a "sense of the faculty" assessment with respect to the Russian challenge.


I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY AND THIS REPORT

This "sense of the faculty" study is unique in at least three respects. First, there was a commitment to focusing on the in-house talent resident at the Naval War College on the faculty. NWC professors are neither constrained by rigid bureaucracies, nor beholden to sponsors for research contracts, nor so close to events that they are chasing headlines. They have a uniquely objective set of viewpoints built on broad and deep intellectual experience. Second, this study aims to gauge faculty viewpoints through the use of surveys. While not without pitfalls, this methodology has the advantage of delivering crisp assessments to decision makers in an efficient format. The organization of this seminar implies, moreover, that these results represent a genuine poll of uniquely qualified experts.

Third and finally, this study embraces an academic approach to policy formulation that emphasizes open and informed debate. There was no expectation that participants would agree on the major issues. Quite the

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DEBATE #1: Russia's Strategic Intentions

LIMITED IN SCOPE

It is clear that Russia under Vladimir Putin is actively working to alter the post-Cold War settlement, and is prepared to use force or the threat of force in certain circumstances. Many now advocate for major increases in U.S. spending and deployments to counter Russian revisionism. Given that any pivot "back to Europe" would shift resources away from other geostrategic priorities, it is important to consider whether a renewed focus on countering Russia is an overreaction.

Russian moves—while deeply troubling to Russia's immediate neighbors—are in the large part limited in scope and are not any effort to restart the Cold War. Russia is seeking the ability to dominate the core of the Eurasian landmass and its adjacent coastal waters. Russia does not directly threaten core U.S. interests and it does not seek to conquer or control Europe but instead to create a "Eurasian" pole of power that would counterbalance the Western Euro-Atlantic world and a rising China.

Russia most directly threatens the interests of post-Soviet neighbors that prefer to be integrated into the West and also seeks to pressure those members of the EU and NATO who favor extending the Western zone into the Eurasian space. This is not equivalent to the Soviet era when the USSR was committed to spreading Communism and was prepared to send military forces into European states in the event of any major conflict with the West.

It is a problem that is containable with existing U.S. forces working with European allies who can deter Russian adventurism from impacting the European core. Indeed,

A DIRECT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

The United States is facing an aggressive and revanchist regime in Russia that is determined to pursue its objectives not just through economic and political means but also through its increasingly capable military. Since Vladimir Putin came to office, Russia has sought to reclaim a sphere of privileged interest along its periphery. In Europe Putin's two principal goals are (1) to hollow out the existing security regime by undermining NATO's ability to act collectively in a crisis; and (2) to exploit the current crisis in the EU, especially the migration crisis, in order to paralyze European Union institutions. This strategy directly threatens the interests of the U.S. and our allies. Russia is a revisionist power, as Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the "greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century."

Since Russian power was significantly degraded in the 1990s, Putin has played from a position of relative weakness; still, before the collapse of energy prices, he nonetheless managed to capitalize on Russia's energy resources to consolidate state power and to modernize its military. During the past 15 years Russia has bought selectively into different sectors of Europe's economies, with a special focus on energy and banking. On the military side, Putin's decision to launch a 10-year military modernization program—at a time when Europe has effectively disarmed and the United States has withdrawn assets from Europe—has significantly altered the balance of power along NATO's northeastern flank. Russian deployments in Kaliningrad and more recently in Crimea constitute a direct challenge to NATO's ability to operate in the Baltic and the Black Sea. This changing strategic landscape poses a direct threat to the

DEBATE #4 Russia in Syria

A Blunder in the Long Run ...

“Russia ... will foolishly own Syria’s dysfunction for the foreseeable future. In the short six months of the intervention, Russia has strained its bilateral relations with Turkey to the breaking point with significant trade and security implications.”

... A Successful Intervention

“In 2013, Putin’s role as an intermediary allowed Asad to remain in power and avoid US military action ... Russia has positioned itself as an honest broker between the Asad regime, Syrian opposition groups, and the US-led anti-ISIL campaign... Action in Syria plays well for the Russian domestic audience and provide a distraction from events in Ukraine.”

DEBATE #5 Russia and China

Unlikely to Form an Effective Coalition ...

“A strategically effective Sino-Russian naval coalition is unlikely because they are each other’s prime adversaries, while the US is at best only a secondary enemy. Historical tensions over the lengthy Sino-Russian border, Beijing’s growing economic clout, plus possible Chinese *revanchism* in Siberia, prohibit a close alliance.”

... Strategic Synergies Are Evident

“[A joint naval] exercise of unprecedented scale (23 surface ships and two submarines) occurred in August 2015 in the Sea of Japan. The tendency in these [bilateral] exercises is toward more complex and realistic war-fighting drills, such as a new focus on anti-submarine warfare. China’s tacit diplomatic support has been crucial on such issues as Russia’s annexation of Crimea....”



- Projects**
- 1. US-China Relations**
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“The Nationalities Question and the End of the Soviet Union”
RESEARCH ON RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE, 2013
 NO. 6

民族问题 苏联之殇
 ——再谈苏联解体的原因

韩克敏

【内容摘要】 苏联解体与苏联制度是两个概念，前者是历史的问题，而解体的原因是民族问题。苏联先决问题是苏共、苏军、苏盟分裂的主要原因。苏联民族问题的根源是民族自治的思想与民族自由的制度。民族自治的最高表现形式是民族联邦制。

【关键词】 苏联解体 民族自治 民族自由 民族联邦制

【作者简介】 韩克敏，1972年元月，中国社会科学院俄罗斯东欧中亚研究所助理研究员。（北京 100007）

一 问题的缘起：解体和剧变、苏联和苏共

苏联解体，是俄罗斯历史的一个重大事件。1991年12月25日，一个空前的大国解体，它意味着欧亚大陆和内陆战争的环境下，世人意料之外的剧变，在其废墟上诞生了15个新的民族国家。探讨苏联解体的原因，有深刻的理论和现实意义。如果剧变不可避免，也就谈不上历史意义。苏联解体，中外学者普遍认为，苏联解体不由单个因素，而是各种合力共同作用的结果。这样的判断虽然合理，但是，在分析重大事件的时候，总有一个主要矛盾和矛盾的主要方面的问题。笔者认为，是俄罗斯民族问题与苏联解体最密切相关的主要因素，而不仅仅只是重要因素之一。

苏联民族问题的根源是苏共的民族自由思想与这种思想产生的民族自治制度（包括民族加盟共和国、民族自治共和国、民族自治州和民族自治专区等特殊表现形式），民族自治制度的最高表现形式是民族联邦制。

“I am not a naïve person who is easily fooled” GLOBAL TIMES, 25 October 2014





“... Russia-China investment projects have been severely impacted.”

“China Should or Should Not 'Rescue' Russia” GLOBAL TIMES, 19 DEC 2014.

“We don't have the ability to save [Russia]...”

“At a time when China is seeking to reform the global system ... and is actively implementing the 'One Belt One Road' [Initiative] ... China requires Russia's support and coordination.”

“What will be the benefit to us? ... we had better not forget Chinese national interests ...”

“Some people think that Russia-China [cooperation] is Russia's only choice, but Russians do not see it that way ... Russia is also emphasizing strategic partnerships with India and Vietnam”



乌克兰事件的世界意义及其对中国的警示
张 Wenmu



“Realizing unification with Taiwan ... Yes, we can. In the Ukraine Crisis, Putin was able to extend his security zone all the way to the south of Crimea, but NATO had no recourse, because [Crimea] lay beyond the reach of its power...”

冷战后俄罗斯战术核武器问题

史建斌

【内容摘要】 战术核武器作为核威慑的矛头,在苏联时期的国家安全和军事战略上的作用毋庸置疑,同时它引发了一系列问题,影响着国际社会的全球战略以及未来战争态势。冷战后战术核武器地位已不再那么稳固,它面临着来自全球性、地区性和国家安全的挑战。俄罗斯在核武器问题上的战略选择,影响着国际安全格局,影响着俄罗斯在欧亚大陆的战略地位。本文从俄罗斯核武器问题的历史、现状和未来趋势入手,分析俄罗斯在核武器问题上的战略选择,探讨俄罗斯在核武器问题上的战略选择,以及俄罗斯在核武器问题上的战略选择。

【关键词】 俄罗斯 战术核武器 核威慑

【作者简介】 史建斌,1971年生,中国工程物理研究院核物理与化学研究所,博士。(北京 100088)

核武器问题可以分为战略核武器和战术核武器。相对于战略核武器而言,战术核武器一般由威力较小的核弹头(核)载体和投掷装置组成,其重量一般在几吨到几十吨之间,其射程一般在几百公里到几千公里之间。战术核武器的发展,主要是为了满足在局部战争中的需要,其目的是在战争初期,以较小的代价,取得较大的战果。战术核武器的发展,主要是为了满足在局部战争中的需要,其目的是在战争初期,以较小的代价,取得较大的战果。

一 俄罗斯战术核武器概况

俄罗斯在战术核武器方面有着悠久的历史。早在20世纪50年代,苏联就开始了战术核武器的研制。在冷战期间,苏联在战术核武器方面取得了巨大的成就。俄罗斯在战术核武器方面有着悠久的历史。早在20世纪50年代,苏联就开始了战术核武器的研制。在冷战期间,苏联在战术核武器方面取得了巨大的成就。

"The Issue of Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War" RESEARCH ON RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE, 2014 NO. 2



吊钩上的伊斯坎德尔


伊斯坎德尔巡航导弹是俄罗斯近年来研制成功的一种新型战术核武器。它体积小、重量轻、机动性强,可以在各种复杂地形和天气条件下使用。伊斯坎德尔巡航导弹是俄罗斯近年来研制成功的一种新型战术核武器。它体积小、重量轻、机动性强,可以在各种复杂地形和天气条件下使用。



俄战役战术导弹部队的作战运用

战役战术导弹部队是俄罗斯武装力量中一支重要的作战力量。它主要负责在战役和战术层面上使用核武器。战役战术导弹部队是俄罗斯武装力量中一支重要的作战力量。它主要负责在战役和战术层面上使用核武器。

战役战术导弹部队的作战运用,主要是在战役和战术层面上使用核武器。它主要负责在战役和战术层面上使用核武器。战役战术导弹部队的作战运用,主要是在战役和战术层面上使用核武器。



664型核动力运输潜艇在水面为641型(F级)常规潜艇进行干货补给示意图,注意艇体后部伸出的吊臂。

装增加到18枚SS3毫米鱼雷,货柜内所运输的货物可根据任务的要求运载海上补给的各种口径的鱼雷。



最高领导人乘坐自海军的核潜艇在大海上遨游。奥

随着核武器技术的发展,核威慑的作用日益增强。核武器的发展,使得国家之间的战略关系发生了深刻的变化。核武器的发展,使得国家之间的战略关系发生了深刻的变化。




Table with 4 columns: 艇名 (Submarine Name), 艇型 (Type), 排水量 (Displacement), 长度 (Length), 直径 (Diameter), 下潜深度 (Submergence Depth), 最大航速 (Maximum Speed), 续航力 (Endurance), 武器装备 (Armament), 建造年份 (Construction Year).