Синдром подъема Китая? Формирование национальных школ теории международных отношений в Азии

Ши Чиюй, профессор Национального Тайваньского Университета

Подъем Китая стал одним из ключевых вопросов изучения в теории международных отношений. В то же время эта тенденция стимулирует изменения в структуре самой, прежде западноцентричной, дисциплины. Она стимулирует рефлексию происходящих изменений в формирующейся китайской школе ТМО. В более широком плане становление китайской теории международных отношений заставляет другие азиатские страны также концептуализировать свое положение в мире, для предотвращения перспективы интеллектуального подчинения своему растущему соседу. Такое теоретизирование опирается на национальные традиции осмысления международной политики (по большей части игнорируемые на Западе). Развитие этой тенденции способствует подлинной либерализации дисциплины.

Ключевые слова: теория международных отношений, национальные школы ТМО, азиатские страны, конфуцианство, подъем Китая, цивилизации, Индия, Япония, Тайвань, Корея, АСЕАН.

China Rise Syndromes? Drafting National Schools of International Relations in Asia

Shih Chih-Yu National Taiwan University, Professor

The rise of China is now one of the primary issues in IR literature. However, this development promotes also changes in the structure of the discipline itself, as it fosters self-reflection in the rapid expansion of the Chinese IR school. Moreover, the quest for Chinese theory of IR provokes other Asian countries to conceptualize their place in the world, in order not to be intellectually submerged by the rising neighbour. This theorizing is enlightened by the national traditions of thinking about international politics, largely overseen in the West. This trend promotes genuine liberalization of the discipline.

Key words: International Relations Theory, national schools, Asian countries, Confucianism, China rise, civilizations, India, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, ASEAN.

Given the abundant literature on the advantages and disadvantages of having an IR theory with Chinese characteristics at the national and international level, a much broader range of reflections on other Asian possibilities has been largely ignored. The quest for national school of international relations is nonetheless a China rise syndrome. This is both because the quest for Chinese IR demonstrates the possibility of non-Western self-understanding and because other Asian nations likewise want to preserve self-understandings outside rising China. This paper will sketch a few selected perspectives that arise from surrounding communities, incorporating Indian, Australian, Korean, Taiwanese, Australian, Southeast Asian, and Japanese sources. This way, theorizing international relations under the circumstance of China’s rise is more a process of breaking the monopoly of European and North American IR and Chinese counter-IR to open up endless opportunities for learning as well as self-searching.

 

The Quest for Asian Schools of International Relations

 

The quest for a place for one’s own nation does not belong exclusively to a rising power. Asian intellectuals aspire for indigenous schools of international relations (IR) that reflect their historical experiences and implicate on plausible international norms for a considerably wider audience[1]. The quest for an indigenous school of IR in East Asian communities traces its origin to the English School, which conceives of international relations as “society” in opposition to “system” in American IR literature[2]. For other indigenous schools of IR, the task is to demonstrate the existence of different kinds of societal norms other than English anarchy or natural law, such as Chinese all-under-heaven, Japanese Asianism, Indian non-alignment, British/Australian Commonwealth, Korean civilizational in-betweenness, or Taiwanese non-sovereign agency, to name a few.

Indigenous schools of IR have two sources. The English School is the external force behind the promotion of Asian IRs. Indeed, societal norms different from those European notions of natural law that inform foreign policy behavior can enrich the English School epistemology. The other force, which is internal, is the national aspiration for representation in the age of global politics. This has been present since the age of imperialism, reinforced in the post-Cold War world by the postmodern call for multiculturalism.

Methodologically, Asia can achieve equality in status through the formation of Asian Schools of IR in three ways; epistemologically, however, each could backfire[3]. First, Asia has subscribed to the same IR principles for a considerably longer time since, for example, the Chinese Zhou dynasty, known as the Spring-Autumn and the Warring periods in row[4]. However, this would mean that Asian history is cyclical/repetitive rather than linear/progressive. Second, Asia subscribes to a completely different ontological order that is strange to Western history, Confucianism and Buddhism being two conspicuous candidates[5]. However, this would mean exclusion of Asia from modernist teleology. Third, in between the first two, Asian states learn to be the modern nation-state abiding by the IR theory but read considerably deeper and richer meanings in accordance with their own culture[6]. However, this would mean Asia’s perpetual alterity.

The following discussion will survey samples of societal norms in the literature that are extant explicitly as well implicitly plausible candidates for a different IR perspective that cannot be easily reduced to Western ontology of states. The chapter searches for narrative candidates for indigenous Asian Schools of IR, including both the contentious Chinese and Japanese alternatives and the non-resistant Indian, Australian, Korean, and Taiwanese alternatives to demonstrate plausibility, however weak, in the conceptualization of Asian Schools of IR and how they allude to a universal IR.

 

Chinese IR as a Response to China Rising

 

Faced with the nascent image of China rising, Chinese intellectuals cannot help but seriously consider and articulately assert China’s role in international relations. A shared appeal to civilizational identity comes to their rescue as they seek meaning in international relations for the future as well as the past. The two most noteworthy attempts to find this meaning that have attracted widespread curiosity and provoked enormous anxiety among the international relations (IR) communities of Europe and North America are those of Yan Xuetong[7] and Zhao Tingyang[8], both find hierarchy instead of balance of power among equals a more plausible order of international relations. In contrast, a less estranging reinterpretation that wins attention shows in Qin Yaqing’s[9] stress on relational governance in Chinese international relations.  

Recognition is still a purpose of Yan’s endeavors but the mood is one of resistance in all three. Yan represents a kind of scientific antagonism when he contends that, historically, IR reality has always been hierarchical; thus, the principle of balance of power among equals that has prevailed over two centuries is no more than a myth. He uses Chinese historical records to demonstrate such a Realist hierarchy, relying specifically on the Legalist tradition. In comparison, Zhao tries to prescribe for the world a romantic philosophy of tianxia, one that is embedded in Taoist and Confucian teachings and which requires no more than a change of cognitive perspective—albeit an unrealistic one—in order for international relations to be characterized by peace and harmony. Qin, instead, stresses difference between relationality and rationality without calling for a threatening re-ordering of entire international relations.

Yan relies on the alleged normalcy of hierarchy to explain away the image of the China threat conjured up by China’s rapidly expanding influence in international relations. The balance of power among alleged equals is a disguised conspiracy to legitimate American hierarchy, whereas Chinese hierarchy is epistemologically a hidden plea for China’s equality. Thus, Yan uses civilizational resources to negotiate for China’s equal status as a nation. His hierarchy appears polemical in terms of how many hierarchies there are or whose hierarchy is negotiable. Zhao’s tianxia, in contrast, transcends the dichotomy of hierarchy vs. equality, but nevertheless philosophizes everyone into a self-content worldview, which is presumably all-encompassing, nonnegotiable, and even disciplinary. There is, however, a lacuna in the tianxia philosophy that can make sense of prevailing violence, historically as well as practically, in Chinese international relations.

Given that all three writers are extensively studied and cited elsewhere, it is only necessary to point out the civilizational ironies in their works before moving on to reflections based on other Asian thoughts. First of all, their IR theorization is, at the same time, counter-IR. For example, appropriating Chinese cultural resources for use in contemporary international relations testifies to the persistence of civilizational, hence nonrational, components in Chinese nation building. Nonetheless, they intellectually Sinicize IR theorization in contrasting manners.

 

Non-resistant Possibilities: India, Australia, Korea, the ASEAN, and Taiwan

 

Transcending Civilizations as Plausible Indian School of IR

India is a multicultural state. Its transformation into a representative of Hinduism and a nation-state is in itself a colonial device[10]. Seeking independence from the United Kingdom by India was simultaneously a process of nation-building and one of state-building. To transcend different religions, languages, and cultures is the function of Hinduism and the Indian national state[11]. In light of this need for transcendence over differences, the ontological mutual exclusion of one nation-state against another is therefore opposite to India’s ontology of becoming a nation-state. In short, coexistence of multiple religions, languages, and ethnicities alludes to anything but anarchy. Note that English, imposed by the British colonial force, was not resented but adopted in the process of nation and state building.

The spirit of transcendence that informs the plausible Indian School of IR refers specifically to the ability to transcend binary thinking embedded in the self-Other relationship in current IR literature[12]. In fact, Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) who inspired followers all over the world specifically treated each individual as the meeting place of civilizations where spiritual transcendence should occur[13]. In short, transcendence does not take the transformation of existing civilizations as its mission. He abhorred violence associated with the modern nationalist movement. For Tagore, differences among groups always exist and yet transcendence is always possible through a higher or more abstract level of inner communication[14]. In addition, he cherished India’s unique historical experience as an exporter of Buddhism to China and Japan, positioning it in the place of civilizational origin. The traveling of Buddhism likewise resonates with cyclical historiography familiar to many an Indian religious belief. Subscribers to such a belief are usually patient with predicament, which is presumably at best transient by nature and therefore worth no immediate confrontation.

Tagore’s preaching was different from Nishida’s, to the extent that the former requires mediation to achieve transcendence while the latter appeared to rely on discursive reinterpretation. Mahandas Gandhi (1869–1948) desired transcendence over civilizational divisions as well. Nevertheless, Gandhi, who answered the call of Indian nationalism, stressed group togetherness more than individual transcendence[15]. For Gandhi, immediate politics must be addressed and enemies must be faced. The subsequent nation-building compelled Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who inherited wisdom from both Tagore and Ghandi, to shift between civilizational and nationalist inspirations.

The Indian School of IR is plausible between two seemingly contradictive tendencies: a long-term, cyclical, historical view that sees mutual exchanges and learning among civilizations natural and beneficial, so that short-run nationalism at the expense of individual free will does not matter ultimately[16]; and a short-term, calculative, suspicious mode of thinking associated with India’s immediate place in international relations, which is inferior. Short-run opportunism, usually understood in terms of national interests, or occasional suspicion that others — especially China — look down upon India may continue to prevail in any specific context. It is this kind of IR that renders the desire for transcendence inexpressible in current IR literature.

The mix of long-term, macro-level transcendence and short-term, micro-level maneuvering contributed to IR theorization in a unique manner. The non-alignment movement is one such benchmark of the Indian School of IR[17]. Nehru’s non-alignment was unlike Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory, which aimed at overthrowing imperialist rule by superpowers. The non-alignment call had no such ambition. Instead, it sought to create new space where superpower confrontation could be neutralized. Nehru, unfortunately, allowed suspicion to grow over Tibet and the Sino-Indian border dispute without any desire or even expectation that confrontation would escalate into a border clash. In Nehru’s much deeper assumption of civilizational amicability, India was not prepared for defeat as it was never prepared for war with China[18].

 

Deconstructing Civilizations as Plausible Australian School of IR

Australia began as a settler’s colony that received criminals from Great Britain. Two concerns dominated Australian IR at its origin. The first concern was about its relationship with Great Britain, particularly the extent to which it should identify with the Commonwealth[19]. There was a racist element to prevent the Chinese, Japanese, and other Asians from invading Australian society[20]. During the Second World War, departure from British national interest concerns finalized Australia’s independent identity. Later, another decision to enhance its global composition was formulated and subsequent immigration policy witnessed reversion to an open door policy[21]. Australia has since welcomed Asians to join its national development.

From being a member of the British Commonwealth, Australia has transformed into a different commonwealth. Not only do Asian immigrants constitute a significant portion of the new Australian labor force, the academic community similarly recruits Asian scholars along with their European counterparts. It is not exaggerating to say that the Australian intellectual establishment resembles a kind of commonwealth to the effect that North American disciplinary methodology has no monopoly in Australian social sciences and humanities. Though realism and rationalism continue to preoccupy IR scholars’ attention in Australia, a plausible Australian School of IR has emerged as well. Recognizing local differences and reading agency into local communities are important features in contemporary Australian scholarship. Nation-states composed of contemporary international relations are themselves composed of sub-national groups; participation of each in world politics is worth independent attention.

Similar to the global constitution of Australian society that directs one’s attention to the subjectivity and agency of its constituting parts — be they aboriginals, immigrants, or diasporas — Australian IR can attend to the constituting parts of other nation-states[22]. One can use the Commonwealth or Continental consciousness as a metaphor for the Australian School of IR. A continent is presumably composed of many different kinds of typography, such as deserts, mountains, valleys, lakes, rivers, woods, plateaus, prairies, and so on. Collectively, though, they belong to the same continent. Members of the Commonwealth share little cultural, geographical, or ethnic similarities, but nonetheless identify with a common head. By treating other nation-states each as a commonwealth, Australian IR can pay particular attention to the survival, welfare, ecology, and adaptation at levels considerably lower than nation-state, and yet acknowledge that they belong to the nation-state. This is particularly clear in studies on China[23].

On the one hand, this commonwealth approach deconstructs nation-states into various local and group agencies. On the other hand, it is sheer recognition of their individualized subjectivities instead of any additional motive either to collect and then rearrange these constituting parts into a GEACS in the case of prewar Japan or to reduce them to sheer confirming cases of a certain universal social science law, as in the case of North America. In short, subnational groups are both international actors and integral parts of a nation. A certain kind of liberal interventionism may emerge. Moreover, Australian IR can benefit from comparative scholarship especially through Southeast Asian studies or Chinese studies[24]. These are sites where diasporic communities as well as ethnic components of society constitute agencies that have universal implications to both global civil transactions and regional international relations at all levels.

 

Bridging Civilizations as a Plausible Korean School of IR

Korea is a nation-state that seats many civilizational divides — between socialism and capitalism, China and Japan, East and West, China and the US, and so on[25]. South Korea has a rich religious reservoir, including traditional Buddhism and imported Christianity. The latter is more popular in Korea than in any other Asian state. Korean society is extremely alerted to development in the US. It relies on the stationing of American troops to defend it from a potential attack by North Korea. Korean academics consistently rely on American schools for higher education as well as for importation of theories.

The unification issue is high on Korea’s agenda. As it seats all kinds of civilizational division and North Korea appears mystifying to the international relations theorists, sovereign unification is not allowed by superpowers[26]. In addition, any unification scheme outside of the realist range will immediately allude to civilizational division that will ruin the status quo of sovereign order desired by the hegemonic US. To assert its status and reflect on the exclusive reliance on the US for both political and intellectual support is not just a Korean phenomenon. This provides a base for universal theoretical implication. In fact, nascent calls for Korean School of IR attract considerable attention indeed[27]. This attempt at the Korean IR should explore possibilities outside of American theories, deviate from the footprint of the English School to make special contribution to IR theorization, and cope with the unique security challenge that involves complicated civilizational politics.

The plausible Korean School of IR can begin with the unification issue. To devise a non-sovereign unification program creatively can avoid the dissolution of either Korean nation-state. Unification otherwise would be a threat to all major powers. More importantly, bridging civilizations through the Korean national question will make a unique contribution. Korea has a rich reservoir of historical contacts with major powers, including China, Japan, and contemporary US. For IR theorists[28], Korea can fare best by being either a balancer or medium among a limited number of national actors, hence minilateralism. Korea will be reduced to China’s protectorate and in fact a subordinate in the tribute system without such minilateral platforms. Alternatively, successful minilateralism can become a model to resolve confrontation of various sorts[29], which Korea has experienced through its position on those civilizational divides.

Since current IR theories as well as their East Asian derivatives appear to concentrate on theorizing major powers’ policy behavior, Korean IR in a way can break up the hierarchy of big and small powers. Korean IR can focus on the civilizational implications of the Korean unification issue and therefore take advantage of its seemingly middle power status. Recent research has turned to the historical possibility, though, that Korea and China actually can be equal in the tribute system[30]. In front of civilizational divides and the attempt at bridging civilizations, nation-states are not differentiated exclusively by their power status. The Korean national question answers directly to the Asian puzzle of whether or not nation-states are civilizational instruments or ontology of IR as social science theorists believe.

 

Appropriating Civilizations as a Plausible Taiwanese School of IR

Different political regimes have taken turns to rule Taiwan over a range of 300 years, including European, Manchurian, and Japanese forces. The island was returned to China after Japan’s defeat in 1945, but became the base of Chinese nationalists fleeing from their defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Taiwan was particularly torn between Japan and China during Japanese colonial rule and the ensuing period[31]. Pro-independence forces rely heavily on support from Japan and the US. Its political leaders carefully watch regional powers to position Taiwan. On the one hand, the island government struggles to secure its place by attempting to be a strategic ally of any potential enemy of China. On the other hand, the socioeconomic relationship with the Chinese mainland is closer than any other nation-states. Taiwan’s contribution to IR theorization may emerge in this irony.

During the Cold War period, the concept of a bipolar system that suited the containment purpose was the prevailing discourse in Taiwan. After the Cold War, the strategic triangle became the dominant approach to studying interactions among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Note that the triangle approach ostensibly provides Taiwan with an equal footing relative to the other two that it would never enjoy due to its exclusion from official international relations[32]. Taiwan’s mainstream IR at all times mimics the development of American IR. In the recent decade, constructivist arguments have emerged to explore the window of opportunity with China. However, behind these careful mimicries is a cynical view of IR, in the sense that IR theories are considered no more than an instrument to achieve Taiwan’s equal representation. Calls for Chinese social science methodology have emerged in the 1980s[33], but never extended to international relations.

A plausible Taiwanese School of IR looms possible in this cynical view. Now that Taiwan has no representation in official international relations, politics of representation shifts to arenas composed of identities other than sovereign nation-states[34]. Taiwan could be a legitimate and equal participant in these nontraditional arenas. How to deconstruct the legitimacy of sovereign state and develop subjectivity for Taiwan in a different arena may be an alternative IR theorization[35]. For example, nascent interest in Asianism can deconstruct pressure for reunification with China to the extent that national unity has little meaning to Asianism[36]. Others resort to Taiwan’s Confucian legacy, which is considerably better preserved in comparison with China’s[37]. Still others raise multiculturalism or electoral democracy in Taiwan to demonstrate that it leads China in its civilizational development stage[38].

To appropriate theories of any kind and represent a Taiwan distinctively apart from China is the major motivation behind the Taiwanese School of IR. This is similar to the Japanese world history standpoint whereby all theoretical situations are at best a temporary site of communication. However, in the place of nothingness, one is supposedly free, universal, and full of agency in facilitating reentry at will. Taiwan has no such power to determine where to enter next. The situation is imposed at all times on Taiwan, whose politics have no alternative other than to adapt. The solution is to reappropriate whatever theory is imposed on Taiwan and make it functional to its equal representation in yet another creative way[39].

 

Disassociating Civilizations as a Plausible ASEAN School of IR

In premodern times, Southeast Asian nations used to interact with the Chinese courts. Their modern history witnessed European colonialism, followed by Japanese occupation during the war. Throughout history, migrants arrived from neighboring areas, among whom the Chinese migrants are particularly noteworthy. This is because Southeast Asia has been the preferred destination of Chinese emigrants. Multiple religious traditions coexist in the region, several with focused residency, such as Catholicism in the Philippines and Buddhism in Thailand and Myanmar. Others are transnational, such as Islam. As a result, the migrant and postcolonial nature of Southeast nations breeds a style of politics unfamiliar to Europeans or North Americans[40]. Disruptive ethnic politics broke out as early as during the early independent period when revolutionary politics in China stirred repercussions in Southeast Asia, begetting Anti-Chinese campaigns. Chinese studies have arisen to tackle the identity politics since then, to deconstruct Chinese identities and disassociate the Chinese with China[41].

Chinese studies in Southeast Asia are not part of either international studies or Chinese studies until Sinicization becomes a faddish topic during the recent rise of China[42], serving as a point of comparison with Islamization, Europeanization, or Americanization[43]. The new scholarly attention thus aroused is a misfortune to Chinese studies, which consistently attempt to establish indigenous Chinese identification through various nuanced distinctions between different Chinese groups[44]. For example, the notions of overseas Chinese, diasporic Chinese, or guest Chinese (huaqiao) are disputed strongly in Southeast Asian Chinese literature due to their Sino-centric ontology as well as the political implications of their being aliens. Instead, it is national Chinese (huazu) or Chinese overseas (huaren) that confirms their indigeneity[45].

Noticeable endeavor by contemporary political practitioners to dissociate domestic civilizational complication in each Southeast Asian state from international relations echoes the attempt at desensitizing Chinese from China in the literature of Chinese studies. The principle of international relations is allegedly the ASEAN Way[46], aimed at a mutually respectful mode of interaction where interventionism is not welcome. The ASEAN Way presumably does not attempt to strike any definite solution to a standing conflict[47]; rather, it seeks to manage it in a way that will prevent conflict from escalating. This requires national leaders to avoid using formal meetings where there would be written minutes, division of majority and minority, and pressure for public diplomacy. Instead, the ASEAN Way highly regards informal meetings among leaders as individual persons. No intervention is possible in the capacity of the ASEAN. European countries and the US criticize the ASEAN Way for being unable to create results[48]. For example, refusal to resort to sanctions gives Myanmar junta free rein to violate human rights. Others call them the land of illiberal democracy[49]. However, through the ASEAN Way, communication with Myanmar authorities remains open and humanitarian aids can continue to flow. If, on the contrary, Myanmar were sanctioned, the ASEAN as an institution will become an intervening vehicle that no one will trust[50].

In brief, the ASEAN Way connotes to IR scholars a kind of indigenous centrism that sets aside abstract values or civilizational identities. The policy implication is to oppose any type of interventionism. Engagement is always more important than position-taking or moral judgment. Only through engagement can there be an international environment that encourages internal reform or reconciliation. Accordingly, regional stability is best guaranteed by informal consulting and personalized trust.

 

Retrieving Civilizations as Plausible Japanese School of IR

 

A plausible, and yet confrontational, proposition for the Japanese School of IR can be derived from the Kyoto School of Philosophy, whose “world history standpoint” was once an ideological support for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (GEACS). The Japanese military regime installed in Manchuria the “Princely Way and Happy Land” in 1931 as an initiative to be emulated elsewhere in the GEACS. Japan invaded Asian neighbors under the banner of cleansing the white race from Asia[51]. What Asia was to become, however, was not just Asians’ Asia, but a universal Asia that could, abiding by Nihon Shoki’s utopia, “roof all eight corners of the world” (Hakkō ichiu). In short, according to world history standpoint, Europe was partial as Europeans only understood Europe while Oriental China was backwardly partial as well because of ignorance in European modernity[52]. GEACS that produced both West and East should be where the world is to be seen in its entirety.

Japan was able to lead in the formation of a universal GEACS allegedly because Japanese people were the only children of Goddess Amaterasu in the world that, unbounded by the limitation of one’s place, could know both sides. Manchukuo was the quintessential site of such imagined infinity because it was the origin of the two major civilizations — Christianity and Confucianism. Japan’s defeat during the WWII did not affect the continued enthusiasm toward Asianism, which is philosophically embedded in the Kyoto School philosophy. The defeat has only led to various reformulations of Asianism to defend it from prewar fiasco or a resurgence in imperialism[53].

The founder of the Kyoto School, Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945), painstakingly replied to the Hegelian challenge that almost all modern Japanese thinkers must face Hegel’s appropriation of Asia to the land of Oriental despotism. In fact, they included Shiratori Kurakichi (1865–1942) of the rival Tokyo School, a strong believer of Goddess Amaterasu as well. Ironically, Shiratori was the best in retrieving civilizations to its Mongolian-Manchurian origin[54]. Impressively, the attempt to retrieve a common origin of all major civilizations was shared by the scientific Tokyo School and the philosophical Kyoto School.

As Japan faced the identity puzzle of whether or not Japan should be a Western or Eastern nation, four options were available. A number of thinkers either affirmed or negated both identities, in addition to others who chose to join one side in opposition to the other[55]. Many changed their positions during the course of their lives, indicating that repositioning had been widespread and conscious. The bottom line was to answer the Hegelian challenge by whichever way appeared to work at a given moment to a given thinker. Kitaro was able to group them all (before as well as after him) in his philosophy of place[56], which he girded by an ontological thrust termed nothingness.

Presumably in the place of nothingness Japan was able to avoid choosing sides. Unlike Hegelian historiography embedded in the dialectical teleology toward an ultimate unity, teaching on nothingness appealed to the psychological exercise of withdrawal from situations/places, therefore avoiding a choice between the seemingly contradicting East and West[57]. It was from the place of nothingness that Japan was able to enter all seemingly differing civilizations, becoming absolute and yet truly universal[58]. The world history standpoint was that of nothingness as well as a religious Shinto way of making both Christianity and Confucianism appear secular since both had been grown civilizations in specific places. Nothingness had to be their common origin to be retrieved by the children of God. Practicing withdrawal to nothingness enables free reentry anywhere, therefore overcoming the arbitrary modernist historiography or stagnant Confucian harmony.

The ability to retrieve the common origin of all civilizations is the root of subsequent versions of Asianism after WWII. The late Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977), for example, proposed to treat Asia as a method of continuous self-denial, through which Japan would not be carried away by any specific civilizational position, be it European, Sinologist, or even Greater East Asian[59]. Contemporary Mizoguchi Yuzo[60] similarly promotes China as a method, by which Japan learns how to study a different nation without taking any specific (i.e. Japanese, European, or American) standpoint. Only by seeing China from its own historical subjectivity can Japan truly belong to the world, which is outside of any national condition in general and Japan’s own in particular. Contemporary scholar Koyasu Nobukuni[61] reinforces this position by treating East Asia as a constant process of becoming, but never a normative destiny to be reached or a physical land to be taken.

Despite the fact that the world history standpoint once supported ruthless killings during war, it continues to inspire generations of Japanese thinkers on Asianism[62]. They have endeavored to purge the history of Manchukuo from future Asianism in their narratives, which once accomplished should be a sharp contrast to the idea of contemporary IR. The latter conceives of international relations as between nation-states so that ontologically, nation-states come before international relations and “international relations” is a threat to nation-states. The world history standpoint finds contradiction between nation-states in such ontology, at best secular and situational. Withdrawal into nothingness enables one to find the deeper self where the world begins. In other words, nation-states are later derivatives of the foundation, retrieval of which makes the side choosing between nation-states a mundane and ephemeral issue. Last but not least, the hidden world history standpoint undergirding contemporary Asianism has attracted a significant number of disciples throughout other East Asian communities[63].

Contemporary Japanese IR scholars such as Akira Iriye and Hirano Kenichiro[64], both students of John King Fairbank (1907–1991) but neither disciples of the Kyoto School, similarly conceptualize international relations as intercultural relations in their respective careers in the United States and Japan. For them, the task of IR theorization is no longer about defending nation-states against the threatening IR but to personalize[65] or localize it, as Irye and Hirano have accomplished, respectively[66]. As a result, one is able to appreciate where others come from. Needless to say, neither would praise the Kyoto School’s service to the GEACS. Nevertheless, they appear likewise comfortable only with a mode of nation-state that traffics amicably among civilizations[67].

 

Conclusion

 

China does not rise in static space, territorially, economically, or strategically. Less noticeable is that China does not rise in one single intellectual space. Not only does the alleged China rising in itself trigger endless debates among its observers over the meanings of China rising, but they also inspire one another into self-searching. In other words, the image of China rising generates multi-sited reflections everywhere, inside and outside of China, so to speak. Many pick up national sites as their base to engage in combination and recombination of IR theorization with civilizational resources that carry a national brand. Consciously or not, all national sites are necessarily individualized endeavors. Therefore, national schools of international relations are not unlike China rising to the extent that no epistemological monopoly is possible.

This paper enlists sources that possibly support national school of international relations for the purpose of opening up the ontology of current IR theorization rooted in nation state, its epistemology rooted in rationality, and its methodology rooted in power calculus. The return of civilization to IR theorization helps one recognize multiple sources of international relations that IR has ignored, making sure that China rising, as well as other parallel or future claims of such elsewhere, does not lead to another intellectual parochialism of previous decades. Multi-sited repercussions out of the image of China rising compose the beginning of intellectual liberation indeed.

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